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Encryption is a vital tool of information technology protecting our data in the world with ubiquitous com-
puters. While photons are regarded as ideal information carriers, it is a must to implement such data protection
on all-optical storage. However, the intrinsic risk of data breaches in existing schemes of photonic memory
was never addressed. We theoretically demonstrate the first protocol using spatially disordered laser fields to
encrypt data stored on an optical memory, namely, encrypted photonic memory. Compare with a digital key,
a continuous disorder encrypts stored light pulses with a rather long key length against brute-force attacks. To
address the broadband storage, we also investigate a novel scheme of disordered echo memory with a high fi-
delity approaching unity. Our results pave novel ways to encrypt different schemes of photonic memory based
on quantum optics and raise the security level of photonic information technology.
The value of encrypted data processing and storage has
been proven by its benefits of protection against data breaches
and theft through the physical removal of computer memory
[1, 2]. An encrypted memory is composed of two compo-
nents, namely, data storage and encryption. Over past decades
photon has been regarded as an ideal information carrier,
and several schemes of optical quantum memory [3, 4] have
been well established, e.g., electromagnetically induced trans-
parency (EIT), [5–12], gradient echo memory (GEM) [13–
17], and atomic frequency comb (AFC) [18, 19]. The missing
piece of optical encryptor may open a vast unexplored realm
of encrypted photonic memory at a security level higher than
existing optical storage systems. In this letter, we theoretically
demonstrate not only the capability but also the flexibility of
using disordered fields [20–22] to set passwords on various
schemes of photonic memory. Incoporating spread spectrum
methods [23] with our scheme, long-distance quantum com-
munication with high degree of multiplexing and noise im-
munity can be implemented via trusted and secure nodes. Our
scheme may also pave the way to encrypt higher dimensional
information, e.g., 2-dimensional images [24–28].
As illustrated in Fig. 1, an echo memory [29] is typically
made of an atomic ensemble (gray spheres) whose absorption
of a probe pulse (blue wavy lines) is modified by another ex-
ternal control field. The following phase of atomic coherence
evolves in a nonuniform way due to the position-dependent
control field strength. When control field is inverted at some
instant, the time reversal of atomic phase leads to an echo out-
put. In Fig. 1(a), we put forward the idea of disordered echo
memory (DEM) using a disordered control field (coloured
surface below gray spheres) whose strength statistics follows
the normal distribution depicted in Fig. 1(c). Green arrows
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aligned aside the system represent the spatial randomness of
DEM atomic dynamics. As a comparison Fig. 1(d) shows
a linearly GEM having ordered atomic dynamics and equal
probability for each field strength (Fig. 1(e)). We find that
DEM leads to very high fidelity of broadband retrieval [30, 31]
when the strength statistics of the disordered field (Fig. 1(b))
matches the Fourier spectrum of incident probe (Fig. 1(c)).
Besides, novel methods of disorder-induced symmetric en-
cryption on optical memories will be presented.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the DEM based on the three-level Λ-
type scheme depicted in Fig. 2(b). The medium of length L
includes two ground states |1〉, |2〉, and an excited state |3〉
whose lifetime is τ and spontaneous decay rate Γ = 1/τ . The
system under study is described by the optical-Bloch equation
[10, 14, 16, 32]
∂tρˆ =
1
ih¯
[
Hˆ, ρˆ
]
+ ρˆdec,(
1
c
∂t + ∂z
)
Ωp = iηρ31,
where ρˆ is the density matrix for the state vector
∑3
i=1Bi|i〉
of the 3-level atom, and each coherence ρij = BiB∗j ; ρˆdec
describes the spontaneous decay of the excited state |3〉 char-
acterized by rate Γ; Hˆ = h¯2 [Ωp |3〉 〈1|+ Ωc |3〉 〈2|+H.c.]
is the Hamiltonian describing the atom-light interaction with
Rabi frequency Ωp of the probe field and Ωc of the con-
trol field; η = Γξ/2L with ξ and L the optical depth and
the length of the medium, respectively. The boundary con-
dition gives the Rabi frequency of the incident probe field
Ωpe
−[(t−tp)/κ]2 , and the initial condition describes the ini-
tial population ρ11(0, z) = 1, ρii(0, z) = 0 for i > 1 and
zero coherences ρij(0, z) = 0 for i 6= j. Two dipole tran-
sitions |1〉 ↔ |3〉 and |2〉 ↔ |3〉 are resonantly coupled to
a probe field and a disordered control field with Rabi fre-
quency Ωc(t, z), respectively. The incident broadband probe
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FIG. 1. (Color online). (a) Disordered echo memory is composed of an atomic ensemble interacting with a spatially disordered field (coloured
surface) and a probe pulse (blue line) to be stored. The green randomly oriented arrows demonstrate the quantum phase evolution of memory
atoms at various sections of the disorder. (b) The probability distribution of the Rabi frequency of a disordered field should cover (c,f) Fourier
spectrum of the incident probe field. (d) Gradient echo memory is made of an atomic ensemble interacting with a linearly gradient field which
introduces a spatially ordered phase modulation. (e) The equal probability distribution of the linearly gradient field strength is distinct from
(f).
field peaks at tp with a duration of κ (1/κ  Γ), and the
disordered control field satisfies the spatial correlation func-
tion 〈Ωc (t, z) Ωc (t, z′)〉 = D2ce−(z−z
′)2/σ2 . The genera-
tion of disorder is given by Ref. [33]. Here we consider
κ = 5 × 10−3τ and the correlation length σ = L/100.
The present broadband DEM relies on the spatially inhomoge-
neous Autler-Townes splitting (ATS) [15–17, 21, 34] induced
by Ωc(t, z) such that each Fourier component of probe field
is absorbed by the modified medium at correspondingly reso-
nant positions [15]. The probe field is then stored as atomic
coherence ρ21(t, z) ∝ sin θ(t, z) and ρ31(t, z) ∝ cos θ(t, z)
where the local phase is [16]
θ(t, z) =
1
2
∫ t
0
Ωc(t
′, z)dt′. (1)
By inverting Ωc(t, z) at some instant ti, i.e., Ωc(t ≥ ti, z) =
−Ωc(t < ti, z), an echo signal will be retrieved due to the
global phase revival of θ(t, z). For a broadband storage we
use Dc > 1/κ  Γ which spreads absorption linewidth
enough to cover the whole spectrum of the probe pulse. The
success of the encryption is based on the cooperation between
the disorder field and time reversal of phase θ(t, z). As illus-
trated in Fig. 2(a), we use a disordered control field depicted
in Fig. 2(e) with Dc = 1000Γ, ti = 0.22τ and optical depth
ξ = 1200 to simultaneously store and encrypt the broadband
probe (Green dashed line). The red solid line shows the only
successful retrieved echo by using key1 profile demonstrated
in Fig. 2(f) where Ωc(t ≥ ti, z) = −Ωc(t < ti, z), namely,
the inversion of the encryption key in Fig. 2(e). To test the
security of the present encryption scheme, Ωc(t ≥ ti, z) is
replaced by a distinct disorder as key2 depicted in Fig. 2(g)
and a linearly gradient field as key3 in Fig. 2(h) for decryp-
tion tests. Blue long-dashed line and gray dotted line show
that two attempts on memory both fail. Another 100 different
disorders are also utilized to descrypt the echo, but none is
successful.
The advantage of Λ-type DEM is depicted in Fig. 3, i.e., a
high fidelity
F = |
∫∞
ti
Ω∗p(t− td, 0)Ωp(t, L)dt|2[∫∞
ti
|Ωp(t, 0)|2dt
] [∫∞
ti
|Ωp(t, L)|2dt
]
approaching unity for a wide range of Dc and ξ. Also, we
numerically observe that in the domain of interest the present
broadband scheme may share the same upper limit of storage
efficiency SE =
[∫∞
ti
|Ωp(t, L)|2dt
]
/
[∫∞
−∞ |Ωp(t, 0)|2dt
]
of around 54% with other echo memory schemes because
of reabsorption [14, 19]. This limit can be overcame by
the cavity-assisted interaction [35, 36]. The underlying rea-
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FIG. 2. (Color online). Panel (a) illustrates broadband disordered echo memory based on (b) three-level Λ-type scheme, and (c) depicts
narrowband EIT memory based on (d) four-level N -type system. Incident probe pulses (green dashed lines) driving transition |1〉 ↔ |3〉 are
encrypted by the disorder in (e), and decrypted by different keys in (f-h). The red solid lines depict the only successful retrieval with the correct
key in (f). The blue long-dashed lines and gray dotted lines are the attempted retrievals by two wrong keys depicted respectively in (g) and
(h). In (a) the access and encryption of a broadband probe are accomplished by the disorder, inverted at t = 0.22τ for decryption, driving
transition |2〉 ↔ |3〉. In (c) the brown dashed dotted line illustrates the temporal sequence of control field for EIT storage. Two disordered
pulses (orange dashed dotted dotted line) driving transition |2〉 ↔ |4〉 are applied, in turn, to encrypt and decrypt quantum coherence.
son for the very high fidelity is that the solution of an echo
signal can be replaced by the inverse Fourier transformation∫∞
−∞ P(Ωc) cos
[
Ωc(t−ti)
2
]
dΩc. The statistics P(Ωc) behind
disordered field strength preserves the shape of the incident
probe field when P(Ωc) ≈
∫∞
−∞Ωp(t, 0) cos
[
Ωct
2
]
dt. Our
FIG. 3. (Color online). The mean fidelity of the disordered echo
memory with correlation length σ = L/100 of Ωc at various optical
depths ξ and control field strengths Dc. The results are obtained by
averaging over 1000 realizations of different disorder.
numerical result in Fig. 3 confirms this optimization of fidelity
whenDc ≥ 1/κ, i.e., the width of the absorption spectrum of
the memory greater than or equal to that of the Fourier trans-
formation of the incident pulse.
To demonstrate the encryption on a narrowband (1/κ < Γ)
EIT-based memory, we invoke the time sequence and the four-
level N -type system respectively illustrated in Fig. 2(c) and
(d). In Fig. 2(c), the green dashed line shows the incident
probe pulse with κ = 10τ driving the transition |1〉 ↔ |3〉.
The brown dashed dotted line illustrates the temporal se-
quence of the spatially uniform control field with Rabi fre-
quency Ωc = 5Γ, which drives transition |2〉 ↔ |3〉. The EIT
light storage is accomplished by turning off control field at
toff = 50τ , and subsequently on at ton = 120τ for light re-
trieval [8–10, 12, 37, 38]. As demonstrated in Fig. 2(d), during
the storage period toff < t < ton, a third switching field with
Rabi frequency Ωs(t, z) shines on the memory to drive tran-
sition |2〉 ↔ |4〉. The Ωs(t, z)-encrypted atomic excitation is
given by ρ21(t, z) ∝ cosφ(t, z) and ρ41(t, z) ∝ i sinφ(t, z)
where the local phase is
φ(t, z) =
1
2
∫ t>toff
toff
Ωs(t
′, z)dt′. (2)
It is the local phase modulation making encryption pos-
sible such that one can locally switch the excitation be-
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FIG. 4. (Color online). (a) Disordered encryption key with length α
interacting with a memory of size L. (b) Decryption key is made of
the inversion of encryption key spatially shifted by δ. The mean δ-
dependant normalized storage efficiency over 100 realizations for (c)
disordered echo memory and (d) EIT-based memory. Dc = 1500Γ
and ξ = 1500 are used in both (c) and (d). Three lines correspond
to different correlation lengths of disorder σ = L/100 (red solid),
σ = L/50 (green dashed) and σ = L/30 (blue dashed dotted).
tween ρ21(t, z) and ρ41(t, z) by engineering the spatial pro-
file of Ωs(t, z). In Fig. 2(c) with ξ = 1200, orange
dashed-dotted line shows that two spatially disordered pulses
Ωs(t, z) encrypt and decrypt the memory with keys respec-
tively in Fig. 2(e) and Fig. 2(f). Two disorders lead to
φ(t ≥ 110τ, z) = 0 and obey 〈Ωs (t, z) Ωs (t, z′)〉 =
D2se
−(z−z′)2/σ2 where Ds = 30Γ and σ = L/100. To also
check whether other keys can recover the encrypted memory,
we use key2 and key3 for decryption. As demonstrated in
Fig. 2(c), blue long-dashed line and gray dotted line reveal that
no signal is retrieved by using keys other than key1 when Ωc
is turned on. The retrieval is also futile when either encryption
pulse (60τ < t < 80τ) or decryption pulse (90τ < t < 110τ)
is applied. Moreover, the decrypted signal peaking at 150τ in
Fig. 2(c) perfectly matches the pure EIT retrieval without any
phase modulation, namely, the disordered encryption proce-
dure preserves the performance of an EIT-based memory.
To verify the degree of the confidentiality of our scheme,
we consider the case that the stored optical memory is re-
trieved by not only inverting the encryption key but also with
a spatial shift δ as depicted in Fig. 4(a) and (b). At δ = 0,
the mean storage efficiency averaged over 100 realizations is
maximized as expected, as increasing δ the storage efficiency
gradually decreases as shown in Fig. 4(c) and (d) for Λ-type
and N -type schemes, respectively. Those faint retrievals in
Fig. 4(c) with normalized SE of about 2%-5% at large δ for
σ = L/50 and σ = L/30 are too noisy to determine their
fidelity. The very narrow σ-dependant window of retrieval
(< 10−3L for Λ-type DEM and < 10−4L for EIT-based
memory) suggests a securer encryption scheme that one can
prepare a much longer disorder with lengthα than the memory
size L, but only a tiny and privately known section is applied.
In order to access the stored photonic data, the precise knowl-
edge of the used section is needed, which assure the confiden-
tiality. The degree of the confidentiality of the scheme can be
defined as χ = α
2
σL , which reflects the increase of confiden-
tiality by using the condition α  L σ. A study of the er-
ror bars of the averaged fidelity of Λ-type DEM also suggests
that a small σ guarantees both security and identical retrievals
from one disorder to another for a given incident probe pulse.
To raise the security level of encryption, a pair of keys can
alternatively be a correlation function and a set of random
numbers, which constitute a disorder [33]. Such an implemen-
tation is resistant against brute-force attack if the key length of
the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is large enough.
More tenable attacks would come in the form of cryptanaly-
sis, where the adversary exploits the system vulnerabilities ei-
ther directly, through the inputs, or the internal states of the
PRNG. Approaches to enhance the cryptographic strength of
the PRGN against such attacks employ cryptographic prim-
itives like the hash function; and by gathering randomness
from external sources to maximise its entropy [39]. Cryp-
tographically secure PRNG passes a suite of statistical tests
[40], with good examples being Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard [2] and the PRNGs published by National Institute of
Standards and Technology [1]. In conclusion, we demon-
strate using disordered fields to encrypt photonic memories
with both high fidelity and high confidentiality. We expect
that the present method is useful for not only the longitudinal
but also the transverse encryption, and the latter can random-
ize and recover the phase of the stored images [24–28]. Our
scheme significantly lowers the intrinsic risk of data loss in
existing memory schemes and makes an impact on photonic
information technology.
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